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Reconstruction and Constitution
Building in Iraq
Addresses by ProfessorA. Kevin Reinhart and
the Honorable Gilbert S. Merritt at
Vanderbilt University Law School, January23, 2004
A. Kevin Reinhart*
I would like to thank Vanderbilt Law School and all of the many
sponsors for the invitation, and especially the Foreign Service Legal
Society whose officers worked so hard to put this together. I
appreciate very much the opportunity to talk to you all about Iraq. I
need to begin with sort of a prelude: the things that were part of my
training are in a way irrelevant to what I was doing this summer. I
was not there in a professional capacity, as an Islamicist; I was there
instead as a volunteer for the International Rescue Committee (IRC).
I would like to mention that the views that I'm about to express are
not those of the IRC, nor are they the views of Dartmouth College.
They are my views though.
The reason that I went to Iraq was because we invaded that
country, and in the immediate period afterward I was not terribly
happy with what was going on. I wrote to a friend who was the head
of the IRC and said "Look, you know, I grew up in the military, so I'm
not afraid of the military. I'm in religious studies and have spent a lot
of time with the ulema in various countries. I'm also fluent in Arabic,
so is there something you can do with me?" And it turned out they
were opening this center in Karbala, which as some of you may know
is the religious heartland of Shi'ism in Iraq. So, they said "Yes, we'd
like somebody who wouldn't put his foot in it right off the bat, and
who could provide a certain amount of cultural training for our guys."
We were interested particularly in working with people who had
been forced out of their homes in the south and who had settledmostly as squatters-in Karbala. There were about 120,000 of them
with whom we were concerned, and for whom we were trying to do
basic things: we hired engineers to bring them water, we hired

* Professor Reinhart is an associate professor of religion at Dartmouth College. He
received his B.A. in Arabic and Middle East Studies at the University of Texas in
Austin and his M.A. and Ph.D in the study of religion at Harvard. His current book,
Colloquial Islam: Unity and Variety in a Cosmopolitan Religion, discusses how we
ought to study contemporary Islam. Professor Reinhart also writes on Islamic legal
theory, ritual practice, and the origins of Islamic discourse in the late Ottoman period.
From June through September of 2003, Professor Reinhart lived in Iraq where his
main job was to set up and direct an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Information
and Services Center in Karbala.
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lawyers to get them integrated back into the system. Many of them
had fled Saddam or were AWOL from the army. Many did not
register their kids so that they would not be drafted and so on. So,
that was basically the way I spent my summer; it was a very
unacademic summer, which was actually nice. (Decision making was
a lot easier, as a matter of fact.) But on the other hand, it was a
terrific learning experience for me to live in the world of Shi'ism, to
spend practically every waking hour with people for whom Hussein,
the imam and martyr, was a living presence in their lives. I learned
an awful lot from them.
Now I want to talk about the reconstruction of Iraq and not the
invasion because the invasion is over; it is not, it seems to me
debatable at this point. For this lecture, I think I will just sketch a
few points, then let Judge Merritt talk, and then we will both be open
to your questions.
When I arrived in Iraq, although I had taught about it and was
fully aware, I imagined, of the wretchedness of Saddam and his
regime, and of the terrible cost to Iraqis, I was still unprepared
emotionally for the psychology of the people I was working with in
these two towns of Najaf and Karbala. There was an overwhelming
need to confess. It was striking to me that people, as soon as they
discovered that we could have the conversation in a language with
which they were comfortable, wanted to talk about their experiences.
They wanted to talk about people who were dear to them, or near to
them, or whom they had known and were killed or raped or tortured.
They wanted to talk about their own experiences with torture. They
wanted to talk about a friend who made a pilgrimage, an illegal
walking pilgrimage between Najaf and Karbala, and how he was
arrested and thrown into a prison that was bombed by the Americans
and from which he escaped temporarily. They wanted to talk about
how this friend then had to sit and listen as the guards discussed,
just as a matter of efficiency, whether they should ship the prisoners
to Baghdad, put them in the local jail, or just kill them-just the
experience of sitting, listening to somebody debating in the same way
one might debate going to 7-11, or Star Market, or Shaw's-should we
kill these guys?
There was also a sense of self-loathing in that people realized
that they had not been complacent but silenced by the overwhelming
amount of force that had been applied to them, particularly in the
early 1990s. It had made it simply impossible to have anything that
we might call public opinion, or even a frank discussion with anyone
no matter how close they were. There were whole codes and obscure
ways of talking that substituted for political discourse.
There were also high expectations, in the period when I was
there, and I think particularly during the period Judge Merritt was
there. People really sensed an enormous world of possibilities. They
had been cut off-forbidden to travel for thirty years, forbidden to
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listen to foreign radio stations-so there was this enormous sense of
possibility. And yet it was a country that had been in so many ways
destroyed. It was destroyed by the massive casualties of the Iran-Iraq
war. This was a war in which on both sides there were perhaps a
million casualties. It was a society that had been damaged by the
sanctions, and I think there is every reason to describe these
sanctions also as "weapons of mass destruction." These sanctions
essentially destroyed the middle class in Iraq, killing thousands of
people who were simply innocent victims. So this was a society very
much destroyed-its infrastructure in tatters. The only people who
had money were people who had been Ba'th party officials and people
who had been smugglers of one sort or another in the period during
the sanctions.
On the other hand, the body politic was enormously welleducated. I have never lived in a place in the Arab world where there
were so many people with advanced degrees. You could go down to
the clothing-selling section of town, for instance, where people had
little shops selling infants' clothes and so on. If you threw a rock you
would hit someone who had a master's in economics, or you would hit
a civil engineer, or an electrical engineer. Maybe these guys were not
up to date in their fields since education and the opportunity to travel
had been so restricted, but nonetheless, many people were highly
educated, eager and on the whole, as we found when we employed
them, well-trained, reliable and scrupulous.
So, it was clear within moments of arriving that, whatever might
have been said, there was no doubt that the United States had to be
"in to nation-building." And I think one of the most important lessons
that we are to draw from the last twenty to twenty-five years, is that
failed nations are the places where terrorists and other enemies of
civilized order go to live. It is where they go to train. It is where they
go to multiply and set-up their operations-Lebanon in the 1980s,
Somalia, Afghanistan of course, and now I have to say, as a result of
the invasion, Iraq.
There are now thousands of Islamic fighters in Iraq. The problem
is that, as we think about nation-building, the previous models are in
many ways, irrelevant. They have largely been countries that are,
completely prostrated by war-in which the war is over and everyone
sees the NGOs and the U.N. as neutral and helpful. By contrast, in
Iraq and I think in other countries in the future, the NGOs and the
U.N. are going to be seen as representatives of the world order and
therefore as opponents; that is, the forces against which they are
arrayed, in a certain sense, are forces that want them to fail. Disorder
serves the interests of a certain group in Iraq and presumably
elsewhere in Afghanistan, and so NGOs and the U.N. are no longer a
neutral or positive force. In a certain sense they are combatants,
insofar as they attempt to restore order and a prosperous economy. It
is not clear that either the U.N. or the NGOs have responded
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imaginatively to this change in circumstance, and this is something
that has to be done over the next little while.
Now, I will just say a word about nation-building from a political
point of view. I know that will be covered in more detail, and of course
with more wisdom and experience, by my colleague, but it is
important to note that the dysfunction in Iraq is not merely material.
Here I want to draw from an article that David Brooks wrote in the
Atlantic Monthly in which he argues from Hannah Arendt's
discussion of Germany and the origin of evil that, in a totalitarian
state, the leader tries to get inside people's heads. He constructs a
regime that is everywhere, one that seeks to obliterate spontaneity,
creativity, and individual initiative, and to dictate thought. The
result is not over-politicization but a perverse de-politicization of life.
People come to understand that they cannot think a political thought
because the wrong one could get them executed; and so they lose the
habits of citizenship. Society becomes atomized and individuals
experience psychological isolation and loneliness because they cannot
be sure even that their own family members will not betray them.
They fall into a passivity induced by the impossibility of action. All
they have is their perpetually whipped-up nationalism and the
omnipresence of their dictator.
That is the society into which we stepped when we occupied Iraq
and the idea that we can import democracy in the same sense that
you might import a radio or a power plant, is simply a mistake.
Building Iraq, from the political point of view is every bit as complex
as constructing the electrical grid, but it is likely to take longer, and
we have to be prepared for the fact that there are going to be slips
along the way. Now unfortunately, my experience was that by and
large the Americans who were sent as direct members of the CPA
were not in a position fully to help Iraq in this nation-building
process. In the whole time I was there, I met only one American who
spoke any Arabic at all. The U.S. civilians increasingly have almost
no contact with any Iraqis aside from the handpicked elite. They live
in a bunker-and this is seen as symbolically significant-in Saddam
Hussein's palace and, literally, they never go out or if they go out,
they go out in big convoys, in huge white SUVs that might as well
have big targets painted on them.
What is regrettable now is that because we are so focused on
getting out, we are cutting deals with elements of the old regime: the
people who provided domestic intelligence to Saddam, militias-the
ones who actually usurped democracy or such democracy as there was
throughout the 1940s and 1950s-tribal forces which are made up of
a combination of ward bosses and feudal landlords. So there is a
daunting task of nation-building in that respect.
It seems to me that the actors in this infrastructural
reconstruction are roughly three. The first is the military. Now, I
grew up in the military and so perhaps I am predisposed to think well
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of them, but I was very impressed with the military. First of all-and
I am talking about them as actors in the reconstruction-I found that
the civil affairs people (the ones I dealt with mostly) were very wellmeaning and they were working very hard. I thought they were really
terrific. Most of them had been sort of yanked out of their livesinitially told that they would be working there for six months, then
six turned into nine, nine into a year-and they were doing things
that nothing in their lives had prepared them to do. For instance in
Karbala, there was a fellow who was in his early twenties who was
doing a Ph.D in plasma physics, so the colonel in charge of Karbala
said, "Well, plasma physics: that has something to do with electricity
doesn't it? You're in charge of restoring the electrical grid in
Karbala". Well, this young man worked very hard and did all he could
do despite getting very little support from Baghdad, but it was
nothing that he had been prepared for and it was nothing that he was
particularly helped with; it was just his own initiative.
The problem with the military life is that they are terribly
overstrained and overstressed. I want to quote from a letter if I
might. This is from a captain in Baghdad, and was sent to a friend. I
have censored it a little for the purposes of public distribution. He
writes:
The biggest gripe I have isn't the heat or the security or the Iraqis. It's
what in military parlance is known as the op-tempo--essentially, the
amount of overtime you work. I begin my day with a meeting at 0800
and end it with another at 2200. I work most of the time in between
and hardly get to do much else. A lot of what I do is stupid ... stuff that
some dumb ... major or colonel wants done but doesn't need to be done.
I've had three days off in the last five and half months. These three
days off I had only because I was able to do R and R in Qatar last week.
I'm stressed out and tired and it doesn't look like we'll get to slow down
anytime soon. I think I'm broke. I'm starting to become an angry man
and lose my patience and not care about things. It's not good for
soldiers to work without rest because everyone needs time to breathe
and relax and we just don't get to do that. I'm burned out. For the guys
who go out on the line and don't get enough rest, it's even worse. I
remember when I was still a platoon leader back in June, we'd go out
on a four-day patrol schedule and by the fourth day we were so tired
and exhausted, that we had no patience when dealing with the
civilians. I saw kids getting pushed out of the way, dogs kicked, old men
cussed at. I tried to stop it where I could but even I got mad and did it
sometimes, especially when I had huge crowds of people around me
constantly complaining about the same things and asking me why we
didn't fix it. A few days ago, some Iraqis got beat up by some soldiers
out on patrol and nobody's entirely sure what happened. I know exactly
what happened. The guys were pissed off because so much of their life
sucks and they can't take a ... breather so they beat ...some dude on
the street who was probably yelling at them or giving them a hard
[time]. We had a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant removed a
couple of months ago for unnecessary violence in stopping some Iraqis
by pumping them full of rounds.
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Now what I want to suggest here is that anybody in this situation will
find it difficult to maintain the sort of civility that we expect of our
soldiers and of our police. When I was there, it was 133 degrees for
weeks at a time (fifty-six degrees centigrade) and these guys were
wearing full body armor and, for example, driving around on the top
of a vehicle. Imagine hours on patrol, wearing body armor, constantly
in fear of someone throwing a grenade at you: I would be pretty
stressed out too, especially when you never get out of the theater and
the amount of time that you are expected to be there keeps getting
extended and extended.
Still, on the whole, I would say that the military is doing as good
a job as they can. I left with considerable respect for them and, in
some ways, I wish that they had a larger role because, in my
experience, the civilian authority was not particularly gifted at all.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was made up of many
people who had done advance work for the campaign, for the
Republican campaign, and that was the extent of their experience. I
met one young man-a nice fellow-whom I asked, "well gosh, you
know, have you been in the Middle East before?"-he was working
with electrification-"Are you an expert in electrical engineering?" He
told me no, that he had done advance work and this was his first
passport. People come after two months, they leave after two months.
They live inside this huge compound. To be perfectly honest, even
with the best will in the world, there is no way that they could be
effective because they simply do not know what Iraq is like any more
than somebody sitting in Nashville knows what Iraq is like. Also
problematic is that their mandate keeps changing as political
circumstances in the United States keep changing.
Yet they were not helpful to the military when the military were
trying to get things done. There was a guy I worked with, a Marinewhom I liked a lot and respected-and he had figured out that
Karbala needed thirty-two megawatts of new electricity in Karbala to
allow a twenty-four-hour power supply. He had found a Swedish
company that specialized in turnkey power generating plants in
Sweden and which specialized in third world work. They were willing
to have a generator up and running in about forty-five days (or
something like that) for about seven million dollars. Now seven
million dollars is chump change-we just approved eighty-seven
billion if I am not mistaken-and this would have generated twentyeight megawatts out of the thirty-two needed for Karbala. It would
have made a huge political difference. Also, electricity is not just
about the lights, it is about whether you can have an economy or
not-if you cannot have a cash register running, if you cannot have a
fan working, if you cannot have advertisements on TV, or if the
printing presses do not work, you cannot have an economy. So, he
filled out all the forms and sent the stuff up the line to Baghdad, but
he never heard back. They stopped answering his email not just
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about the power production but about anything. If he wrote them and
asked them if tomorrow were Tuesday, they would not answer his
email. He never found out what he had done wrong. Was it because
this was seven million dollars, was it because the company was
Swedish, was it because he had overstepped his mandate somehow?
He never heard. So, unless things have changed radically since I was
there, the civilian authority is not up to the task and this is a serious
problem.
There are two classes of NGOs-and this is going to sound a
little tacky but this is why I said it's nobody else's opinion but my
own: One class I would say, gets it: CARE, IRC, Mercycorps, CHF,
some branches of Catholic Relief and a few others. They are the real
deal: they are in there, they have their sleeves rolled up, they are out
there in the middle of nowhere building wells, constructing roads,
opening and running programs to teach people about democracy and
so on and so forth. I met a lot of totally admirable people whom I
greatly admired, and they learned more about Iraq than you can
imagine. Most of them had no Arabic, it's true, or had never been in
the Middle East before, but nonetheless they worked very hard, they
had relevant experience, and they did good work.
There were other groups however that were either in over their
heads or were grand-standers. And you have to understand, as I said
before, that the model for NGO work in the past has been these
prostrate nations where everything was politically calm and
everybody thought of the NGOs as good guys. So they drove around in
big white SUVs with the names of their organizations on the side,
everybody deferred, they got through all the checkpoints, and
everything was fine. But the circumstances were different in Iraq,
and some adapted themselves to it but others did not. Some insisted
on driving around in their big white SUVs and they got shot at. ICRC
lost four people, IOM had the driver killed and two people scared
practically to death by a sustained machine gun attack on them.
Another incident had to do with mines in the north, the vehicle was
attacked and the driver, a British NGO guy, was killed. But the
organizations that I respected said, "OK, things have changed," and
figured out how to deal with it. They went to regular civilian
vehicles-for instance, we had a clapped out old white Toyota that
would probably get you arrested if you were driving it in Nashville.
IRC was particularly good at just getting cars and minivans that
looked like ordinary vehicles on the roads and using those to go out
and work. But, some others were still grand-standers. They were
opposed to U.S. policy. Fine, I can understand that but they used the
circumstances and the deteriorating security situation as a way to
make political points, and they all quickly ran away to Amman where
they lived on nice per diems and issued press releases saying it was
all the Americans' fault. I will refrain from naming names here,
except for IOM, but some of them are quite well-known organizations.
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The U.N. was not flexible either and, as far as I could tell,
although it is politically important to have the U.N. there, the various
aspects of the U.N. that were supposed to help in the rebuilding of
Iraq were among those that were unable to cope with the fact that
they were perceived as the enemy by some people. Further, the
combination of "we-are-not-the-Americans, we-are-here-to-be-friends"
and the denial of the reality of things is what played a major part in
the Canal hotel bombing which killed a number of people I knew and
injured lots of people, including the fiancee of one of my fellow
workers at IRC. So NGOs have to evolve. There were eighty-two
NGOs there when I came in June, there are now I believe eight
operating. Many people just came and did not have a clue and so left
immediately. As far as I know, the grand-standers are still in
Amman.
The real group that I want to talk about, because if we are losing
the occupation, it is my belief that it is the structure that we chose for
the reconstruction that is losing it for us, is the major contractors,
Halliburton, and particularly Bechtel-the fact is that Bechtel is a
huge sort of General Motors-type organization. What we need is a lot
of little contractors going around and repairing particular problems.
Yet the major contractors also sit in their bunkered hotels
surrounded by rent-a-cops, and they hire Iraqi contractors without
investigation beforehand, and they fail to inspect the work
afterwards. Then, you might see a school with a big sign on it saying
"this school repaired by Bechtel" written in Arabic.
I was with some people from IRC in the office of the local
Minister of Education when a principal came in who did not
understand who we were and immediately launched into this whole
complaint with the Minister about his school, which had just been
restored by Bechtel. He was furious, and it really was a litany of
horrors. The ceiling-a concrete-rebarred ceiling-was falling in and
all the contractor had done was push it up and hold it together with
spackle. There were two rooms with tiled floors, so they scraped up
the tiles from one room and tapped them down with concrete in the
other and then just poured concrete over the floor in the first room.
They did nothing in the bathrooms except put new sort of plaster
floorboards in the toilets, when the big problem was that the septic
tank was full and the pipes out of the toilet were corroded or clogged.
They did nothing about that. On and on and on he went. And when
the Minister asked him, "Well didn't you have a chance to talk to
these people? Who were they?" He responded that they were Iraqi
contractors for Bechtel. The problem was that the Minister did not
even know how to contact Bechtel, because they had simply chosen
these schools without talking to him. No one could find out which
schools were picked for rehabilitation; there was no list to which the
Minister of Education had access.
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As an American, I could contact Bechtel over email and get the list
so we did not duplicate our efforts. But the Iraqis had no idea which
schools were going to be reconstructed. In the time I was there, no
work was done on the electrical infrastructure of these two major
towns, these two politically powerful towns at all. Email that I continue
to get from Iraqi friends says that the electrical system, if anything, is
deteriorated. After a year, no progress has been made whatsoever.
We have a serious problem here and it is going to be the
reconstruction of Iraq physically. As Tip O'Neil said "all politics is
local" and Iraqis are thinking locally. They want to know about
potholes, they want to know about water, they want to know about
electricity. Those can be victories, and right now, quite apart from
everything else that is happening in the country, they are, instead,
defeats.
I am going to end now by asking the simple question: "Why
should we be involved in Iraq after all?" First of all, there is a sense
in which we should do it simply because these are people who
desperately need help. And, unless you are callous or bigoted, or very,
very shortsighted, you want to help them. Americans in particular
should support the reconstruction because for whatever reasons,
however justifiably, we did destroy the infrastructure in 1991, we did
maintain its destruction through the sanctions throughout the 1990s,
and we did invade and occupy the country in this last year. So, in a
sense, if you break it, you should fix it. But also, I think what is really
important is that it is in our interest to have a stable Iraq that will
not turn into another Afghanistan. And it very well could. More
importantly, perceptions of the United States throughout the Muslim
world are very, very negative, and to the extent that we fail to
reconstruct Iraq, it will be seen as a deliberate act and an act of the
unkindest, most subversive sort. A terrorist act against civilians, if
you will. In place after place, I would go in and people would complain
about the electricity. They would say "look, this army of Iraq kept us
subjugated for twenty years, and the Americans cut through it like
butter. Now they say they cannot fix the electricity? I don't believe it.
I don't believe it. They must be doing this for a reason. They want to
keep us weak. They want to keep us miserable." Now, we can talk
about democracy until we are blue in the face, but it seems to me that
our competence, our pragmatism, our tradition of being un-ideological
and problem-solving-oriented is one of the great things about the
United States. That is what we should be exporting. If we fail to fix
things, if we cannot make it work, that suggests that we are not all
we are cracked up to be. People will no longer believe us about
democracy if they can't believe us about electricity. Thank you very
much.
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The HonorableGilbert S. Merritt*
I would like to begin with two or three stories that seem to me to
provide a little setting, a little insight on the culture-the legal
culture to some extent but also the general culture and the Iraqi
people-anecdotes that I think are somewhat symbolic. Then I will
talk about the problem we have now in trying to create a
constitutional democracy in Iraq.
I agree with almost everything my colleague said-not quite
everything, but almost everything. I certainly agree with him about
the CPA, for whom I supposedly worked-not worked, but advised (to
use the euphemistic description of what I did). I also agree with him,
or with his implication that really the only plausible reason for our
being there now is, looking with hindsight, the humanitarian reason
that we, in Desert Storm, simply departed and left the people of Iraq
under the jurisdiction of Saddam Hussein. Then we called upon the
Shi'a by radio and otherwise to rise and rebel, and many thousands of
them did so, and many thousands of them were killed as a result. The
bones that are being found along the roads and in other places in Iraq
mark the burial grounds of many of those Shi'a. The second thing we
did, as my colleague suggests was to impose sanctions. The sanctions
had the effect, as I was told by almost every Iraqi-and keep in mind
I was talking to Iraqi lawyers, and judges, the Supreme Court
members of Iraq, court of appeals members and lawyers and that
they were unanimous in this view-of further impoverishing the Iraqi
people. So, the plausible reason for being there, for me, is entirely the
humanitarian reason, to try to some extent to right the wrong that we
created as we left after Desert Storm.
We now know that at least there is no evidence of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons, and that there is no significant
evidence so far that Saddam was deploying or financing Al Qaeda or
similar terrorists, so that leaves us with the humanitarian reason
and it leaves us with the promise we have made to Iraq of a
constitutional democracy, to be held up as a model in the Middle
East.
I will talk about that latter thing last for just a very few minutes.
Let me first say that when I got the call to go over there as an "advisor"
the first thing I did-this was about a week before I was supposed to

* Judge Merritt is a Senior Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. He was formerly Chief Justice on that court. He graduated from Vanderbilt
Law School in 1960, and has taught at Vanderbilt for a couple of decades. Judge
Merritt was in Baghdad in the summer of 2003 as part of a 13-member Justice
Department delegation sent to assess the country's legal infrastructure and make
recommendations about what sort of justice system could and should be implemented
there.
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leave and I guess they couldn't find anybody else who was willing to
go-was to call a dear and longtime friend of mine from Nashville with
whom I went to college, Rocky Suddarth. He had just retired from the
State Department. He was an Arab expert, and he was an ambassador
to Jordan. Of course he spoke Arabic. I talked to him many times about
his experiences in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. I asked him, "Rocky,
should I do this?" and he said "Oh for God's sake, yes! You know
they've got it so screwed up, that you can't screw it up any worse, so
you should go." And he said, But, when you get there.. ." and he gave
me all the background of the fight between the Pentagon and the State
Department over who was going to control things there and the
rejection by the civilians and the Pentagon of the planning that took
place over a number of months by Arab experts in the State
Department who thought they knew, and he told me why he thought
General Gardner was being discharged and replaced. He said:
When you get over there, my guess is that they're not going to have
anything much for you to do. They're not going to have a plan, they're
not going to operate the way you are normally accustomed to operating,
and let me suggest to you, look upon it as an adventure, when you get
there if that's the case, make up some things you think yourself might
be helpful, and go about it and tell em over there that's what you want
to do.

Sure enough, when I got there, there was not any plan. I met
several Iraqi lawyers and judges, and within two or three days I could
see a few things that I might do that would be helpful. (In the
question and answer session I will be happy to tell you the chores I
did in interviewing judges and making reports about that.) I met
some very interesting people. Let me give you a few little anecdotes.
When I got there I quickly met two Iraqi lawyers. One, a Sunni,
who was married to a woman lawyer, a Shi'a woman. They had two
children. I went out to his house many times: he has a little bitty
garden, and where he lived, his house had been burglarized twice or
three times there in Baghdad. He was also an engineer, and he had
been a major, I believe, in the Iraqi army during the Iraq/Iran war. He
escaped from getting killed by becoming an engineer and not having to
go to the front. Actually both of these fellows were sort of translators,
bodyguards, and drivers-we had a car-but more than anything, they
were teachers. And they were very interested in learning about our
civilization, our culture, and they were very fit also, in trying to teach
me about theirs. The other lawyer, Zuhair, had been the lawyer for the
Arab league in Baghdad before the war, he had majored in English at
Baghdad University, he had a master's in English literature, and had
written his thesis on ParadiseLost, he was also married to a lawyer. I
had met these two, one through the other, they were in law school
together, Zuhair and Samir. Zuhair was married to a Sunni, has one
child. He is now a judge, but when I got there, neither one of them was
doing much of anything. Everybody was unemployed for the most part.

776

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 37765

Rocky, my friend at the State Department, had also told me to
"Try to stay out of that palace over there if you can, you'll get stuck
there and you can't get out." I stayed in a hotel, which could have been
blown up easily but at the time when I was there it was not as
dangerous as it is now. The car bombing by the al Qaeda types had not
started yet. Anyway, Zuhair, Samir, and I went all over Baghdad
talking to people and going to the shops, the so-called Ali-Baba
bazaars, the places where after the looting, all of the stolen goods were
being fenced. It was an amazing situation over there-the looting that
took place should never have occurred. I mean we should not have
permitted it to occur. The whole of Baghdad was practically destroyed
as a result, not of our bombing, but of the looting. Anyway, Zuhair,
Samir, and I and his family became fast friends and I continue to
correspond with them.
Let me give you a little example of what I found about Arab
culture and Islam just through a little anecdote. Zuhair particularly,
the Shi'a lawyer, liked to talk about philosophy and religion, to
compare Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. So, he said to me, with
Samir there and a couple of other people, "Judge, what do you think
about the theory of evolution, Darwinism?, What's the attitude about
that in the United States?" and I said "Well, most people who are
fairly well-educated believe that the theory of evolution, natural
selection, is the best explanation for creation, and I must say I agree
with that." And, we had a conversation about what exactly the theory
of evolution as we now, as we now talk about it, consists of and
finally, Samir said, "Judge, that just can't be true; we're not
descended from the apes." And I said, "well that's not exactly what it
is, but why do you disagree?" He replied:
Well, you know the Koran doesn't say anything about evolution or a
theory of creation other than a kind of a Hebraic theory of creation by
Allah. But, in the sayings of Muhammad-which are not the word of
God, but the prophet says that these are his opinions and they are just
up for discussion-it says that the apes descended from man, not the
reverse. The prophet said the apes descended from man because many
eons ago, there were all these desperate sinners and Allah got tired of
the sins of this group and so he changed them into apes. So, we've had
apes ever since and they were descended from human beings and not
visa versa.

And I said, "Do you believe that?" And he said, "Well, that's what the
sayings say and you know we're inclined to believe the words of the
prophet here." You have to transport yourself to a culture that is
unlike our own, which is very heavily influenced by Christianity and
Hebraic tradition, to quite a different basis in their culture-the
Islamic tradition. This tradition is probably more powerful in Iraq,
and certainly in Saudi Arabia and other places, than the Christian
tradition is in the West, in Europe, and in the United States.
Another little story here: I asked my friends in Iraq, particularly
Zuhair and Samir, how all these bus drivers are taking people all
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around Baghdad? Baghdad's a city of who knows how many, six or
seven million, and when I got there, a few days after the war and
looting were over, there were big red buses, double decker buses as
you might see in Manhattan or in London, traveling around carrying
people, and many small buses. Zuhair and Samir tried to explain to
me that the bus drivers were private. There was no governmental
sponsorship. There was no government, except the CPA, which was
not a very effective government. So, this was all private initiative
taking place, both the small buses and the great big buses. I said to
them "Could we get together with these bus drivers or some of them,
and could you translate so that we can find out how this took place?" I
was just curious about it. He said sure there's a bus terminal where
they meet right in this location, and he set it up for two or three days
later. This was during the first couple of weeks I was there.
We went down for a couple of hours and they translated and I
gave them a few dollars so the bus drivers would loosen their tongues
a little, and be as frank as possible. They explained to me how they
had set up this system. All of the old bus drivers, or not all but most
of the old bus drivers had gotten together not long after the war was
over. They sat down together and discussed how they had taken the
buses home before the war (they knew the war was coming, and so
instead of taking the buses back to some central place to be perhaps
destroyed, they had taken the busses and parked them near their
homes or somewhere else where they could find them). There were
300 of these Chinese double-decker red buses and they decided they
would need about half of them to be on the street, and they would use
the other half for the parts, to keep the buses running and they had a
big conversation about how much they should charge and they
decided to charge the same amount that they were charging before
because they would catch a lot of hell from the Iraqi customers if they
jacked up the prices. They also did not think they should jack up the
prices under such difficult circumstances because it would not be fair.
So, they maintained the same price and got the big bus system back
in operation.
The small buses were more private. The big bus drivers said they
were going to take the buses back when there was a government set
up, but the point of that story is simply the initiative of these bus
drivers, they are not well-educated people, there are many many very
well-educated people as professor Reinhart says, a lot of advanced
degrees in and around Baghdad, but these were not such welleducated people. Still, their instinct was that there was a market out
there, and that they should do this for both their own interests and
for the interest of their customers. So, they set up a bus system-and
I do not know what the system is now all these months later but it
was quite an interesting way of going about. The initiative of the
Iraqi people is substantial, and much of what has occurred that is
good in Baghdad (which is where I was, and I can't speak for many
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other towns) is primarily the result of the initiative of the Iraqi people
after being freed from this tyranny.
I could tell you many other stories, but I will now turn to the
effort to create a constitutional democracy in Iraq. Bremer has
completely botched this job. There are, I think, plausible reasons for
our being there, but there is no plausible reason in my view for doing
it the way we are doing it.
When I got there in May, Gardner was leaving. Bremer had just
arrived. Gardner was in the dining hall, eating with the troops and
with the civilians who were there. He was very accessible. Bremer, it
turned out, was not accessible at all. In our group-we had three
federal judges-I was the only appellate judge and there were two
federal district judges. We immediately asked if we could talk to
Bremer a little bit about what he thought our mission might be. We
never heard back. We repeated the suggestion several times during our
couple of months there, and never heard back from Bremer. So, I do not
have a great regard for Bremer as you might expect, but the problem
was that what he was spending his time doing was creating the
governing counsel of Iraq. The twenty-five members, now twenty-four
members, who are supposedly running Iraq as our advisors, but the
Iraqi people know that most of these members of the governing counsel
are ex-patriots. There are few indigenous Iraqis who stayed and
suffered on the governing counsel (one of whom I would like to mention
in just a moment did so, and he is a very courageous man). But, they
spent three months getting this counsel together. I suggested to some
of Bremer's representatives that what they ought to do, and others
suggested the same thing, was follow Gardner's general suggestion of
having the Iraqi people see that the Americans are trying to turn over
sovereignty and self-rule to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. My view
was that the way to do that was not to have a governing counsel but to
start a freestanding constitution-making process by which the Iraqi
people would see that pretty soon they were going to have a permanent
constitutional government in Iraq, but I got nowhere with that.
My thought was that we could set up a group, maybe a fifteenmember group of Iraqis. There are many Iraqis who know a lot about
constitutional government. Iraq has had a constitution. The British
set up a constitution which was, for its day in 1925, quite a good
document. The group could draft a constitution and, at the same time,
we would get the U.N. in there. Their expertise is in running and
creating electoral systems. You cannot have a constitution adopted
without having a constitutional convention and that should be done
through an electoral process which required having a census. There is
no census, still no census, eight or nine months later, still no census,
still no electoral machinery, no system of voter registration.
But, if we got the United Nations in, we could have a census and
electoral machinery established within four or five months. That did
not occur, obviously and there is no census and there no electoral
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machinery. That's the core of the problem now between the Shi'a
clergy, particularly Sistani, who I think quite rightly is insisting that
he does not want some transitional government being given
sovereignty over Iraq on July 1, which is the plan suggested to and
adopted by the governing counsel. He does not want that because for
centuries, under the Ottoman Empire, as I understand it, and during
the British mandate and under Saddam, the Sunnis have governed
Iraq and the Shi'a who make up the majority, sixty to sixty-five
percent most likely, have been ruled by the Sunnis. He says 'You
know that is not going to happen, that is not the constitutional
democracy we were promised. A constitutional democracy requires
elections, not the naming by the Americans or by some kind of
caucuses that you don't know who's controlling. We want elections."
And, I think he is justified in making that demand. But we are a long
way from being able to do that because we have no electoral
machinery, and no census. It is going to take I do not know how long
to do that. So, the plan by the governing counsel is to have an election
for a constitutional assembly, not for this sovereign transitional
government but for a constitutional assembly, sometime in 2005. The
constitutional assembly will be a large group. It will get together to
come up with a constitution and, subsequently, there will be a
referendum for the Iraqi people to vote up or down on the
constitution. If they vote up, then a government will be elected. Well,
that will not take place until (really God knows when) 2008 or 2009.
Putting a constitutional assembly together in this way is going to
be very divisive. There are lots of ethnic, tribal elements in Iraq. There
will be a lot of division over what the constitution ought to say, and if a
coalition, for example, of dissatisfied Iraqis get together-if Kurds get
together with some branches of the Shi'a and the Sunnis-the whole
thing will be defeated and the process will have to begin again. So, I
think, the CPA has been basically incompetent with respect to the way
they hope to turn over sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and there is now
no visible constitution-making process in place. I am particularly
disappointed about that because that falls in with the daily work in
which I am most interested. Why don't I stop there as I've taken more
time than I intended to, and let's see what your views and your
questions are, and comments. It's a pleasure to be here, and
particularly a pleasure to be here with Professor Reinhart. I obviously
don't speak Arabic, but my experience in the judiciary, in addition to
being a judge, was running our judicial foreign relations group for a
while, setting it up and going to different countries and it is always an
adventure to go over and talk to the judiciaries of other countries and if
you ask me questions about the judiciary in Iraq or the system of law
based on the Napoleonic code, I'll be happy to talk about that. Thanks.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q.:
What other countries are participatingin the
operation? Is there any hope of getting the United
Nations involved?
M: Though there are some countries there, it is an American show:
the CPA is run by U.S. authorities; the U.S. military is providing
security. We have recently begun to get the Iraqi police force up and
running but it is still basically an American show. All the major
decisions are made by the Americans. Though the idea of getting the
United Nations in place in any capacity was rejected for a long time,
now we're coming to our senses a little bit, and trying to get the
United Nations in there. We should have done that a long time ago,
but it is still primarily a U.S. operation.
R: I might add that there is the coalition of the willing-to-be-bought
which includes powers like Mongolia and El Salvador. In the town
that I was working in, Bulgaria and Poland were responsible. There
was a firefight in which some U.S. MPs were pinned down. They
called over the radios for help but the Bulgarians had to go find
somebody who could understand English to receive the call. Once
they got that person, in order to respond-since they were under
Polish jurisdiction-they had to go to the Poles. But the Poles didn't
have anyone who spoke Bulgarian, so they had to find a Bulgarian
who spoke Russian and a Pole who spoke Russian. The result wasand fortunately none of the MPs were killed-it took three hours to
respond. So, I concur completely, this is an American show and to the
extent that we're dressing it as an international thing it seems to me
only to weaken our military posture.
Q:
To what extent do you find that the governing
counsel is actually seeking counsel from the populous
at large? Are they in the bunkers as are the rest of the
U.S. civilians and the CPA? Second, given what you've
seen, to what extent do you anticipate the new system
of law, whenever it gets established, will incorporate
elements of Islamic customary law-in terms of the
way judges adjudicate cases involving marriage,
property ownership, etc.
M: The governing counsel is trying to take the pulse of and be
representative of the Iraqi people, though some more than others, and
some of the members of the governing counsel are as I understand it,
more politically ambitious than others. Let me say this about one of
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them: Judge Dara, whom I got to know the first week I was there
ended up going to jail. He was a court of appeals judge, and he went
to jail because he held unconstitutional one of Saddam's edicts about
taking property. He was from a very distinguished Kurdish family
and he refused to relent and reconsider his decision. They hauled him
before a revolutionary court-there was a regular court system which
functioned for the most part just to deal with regular legal cases, then
there was a revolutionary court system, and then there was execution
without any kind of court system. The revolutionary court sentenced
him to jail for two years and he spent a good bit of time in jail and
was released in the general amnesty just before the war. I found all
this out from the lawyers-he was their great hero.
When I asked lawyers and governmental people whether they
knew any judges who you think are really outstanding people-any
Nelson Mandelas who are judges, everyone would mentioned Judge
Dara. I spent many hours talking to him and he passed along to me
his views about the other judges, the lawyers, the legal system, how a
constitution might be created, etc. They had no lawyers, or judges, or
anybody like that on the counsel. I went to people I thought had some
influence in the government section and said, "Look, you've got to
have somebody protect the rule of law who knows something about it.
This guy has not only shown the courage, showed the courage that he
did-married, with two children, and still upholding the rule of lawa kind of Sir Thomas More of Iraq." So, they finally did agree to put
him on the counsel. So, I know they have one good man on the
counsel, and I think others too.
The second question you asked about the law. Yes I think there'll
be Islamic elements in the system. The system is a civil law system
which came through Egypt because Egypt, during the time of
Napoleon's campaign, adopted a kind of Napoleonic code system with
Islamic elements in it and that was later passed along to Iraq. The
domestic law, the domestic relations law, family law, all those things,
tended to reflect very much the Islamic system. However, the civil
code, the codes of procedure, and the codes of contracts and the
criminal code, more reflected the Napoleonic code than it did the
Islamic tradition. That is what I was told by all the judges and
lawyers and of course we're dependent on them to inform us as to how
the system works. We don't have any independent knowledge, at least
I don't. My friend does probably.
R: There's one interesting development in the last week: the
governing counsel abrogated all of the Iraqi laws having to do with
familial relations and simply declared that in cases of child custody,
marriage, divorce, and inheritance, Islamic law would be enforcedwithout a democratic discussion or anything. They simply made a
radical change in the code. It's not just values but actually Islamic
jurisprudential norms now. Women have objected to it, there have
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been some demonstrations. Furthermore, instituting Islamic law
doesn't solve much either. With inheritance, for example, between the
Shi'a and the Sunnis there are radical differences.
Q:
What is the possibility of it ending up a
theocracy, and what is the possibility of the end result
being three states: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis?
R: I agree with Judge Merritt that a democratic government of
Muslims is eventually going to reflect Muslim values, just as when
this country was overwhelmingly Christian, our laws reflected
Protestant Christian values. Everyone has repudiated the idea of a
theocracy in the Iranian sense, including the Shi'a clerics. I think
they understand that, having seen Iran, when the religious
establishment gets tied up with politics, what actually ends up being
weakened is the religious establishment. In Iran, Islam is an object of
contempt for educated young Iranians, and they're afraid of that
happening in Iraq. I think that's significant.
Before I went over, I thought it very likely we would end up with
three states but, except for some Kurds, I found nobody who thought
that was a plausible or desirable outcome. I was quite surprised. I
have friends, in Najaf for example, who told me, "you know Baghdad
is very dear to all of us Iraqis." I suspect much more likely will be a
federated state, but I think the crucial thing is going to be that all
Iraqis must have the right to live in all parts of Iraq. And if that's the
case then it seems to me we could have a plausibly functioning Iraqi
state without the kind of separation that you're talking about.
M: I agree that we are not likely to see three separate states. For
example, this fellow Judge Dara who's a Kurd, his father was on the
Supreme Court of Iraq and moved to Baghdad. There are lots and lots
of Kurds in Baghdad. They say the biggest group of Kurds lives in
Baghdad now but of course there are also a lot of Kurds in the north.
His grandfather was one of the governors during the British mandate
of two provinces and his great-grandfather was a judge in the old
Ottoman Empire. He comes from this long tradition and he told me
that there is not any, in his view, reasonable sentiment to split up
Iraq into Kurdistan, the center, and the Shi'a in the south. So, I agree
that it's not likely to happen. There is enough history here so that
there is some national feeling in favor of an Iraqi government. It's
going to be very hard to put together. And I think it does have to be
some kind of federated state.
On the subject of theocracy, yes there will likely be theocratic
elements in any new Iraqi constitution. All of the people I talked to
were pretty well-educated and they were all pretty secular in their
views. They told me that they didn't think there was a lot of
sentiment for a great theocracy in Iraq but that they could be wrong.
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That has yet to be determined but Islam is a great force. The two
things that hold Iraq together are 1) the language, -Arabic, and 2)
ninety-nine percent are Muslims. Those two elements are the
unifying elements-the unum in their pluribus so to speak-in Iraq
without which I don't think you could have a unified state, federated
or otherwise. They will have to work out how much theocracy is
appropriate. After all Israel is a theocracy. There are benign
theocracies.
Q.:
You mentioned earlier that there were two
major contractors, Bechtel and Halliburton, and then
you discussed the CPA. What is the relationship or
interaction between these entities? Do you see a
resolution to what seems to be their overall
incompetence in the area.
M: Well I wouldn't say that the CPA, Bechtel, and Halliburton are
incompetent. It's more that they made a lot of mistakes. Bechtel is
much in evidence in Baghdad. They go out and fix schools and choose
the schools they want to fix and everything else. They are a huge
corporation. The operation sits in a park, next door to the republican
palace in Baghdad, which is in the green zone or the protected zonequite a large area on the bank of the Tigris River downtown. Bechtel's
operation is practically as big as the whole CPA operation. Because
they sit just next door, I went over there several times to talk to the
Bechtel people. They had these very large prefabricated offices that
they fly in-like big trailers-they do it all over the world. They must
have had fifty or sixty of them on ten or fifteen acres, right in the
middle of the CPA's operation. They have a communication system
through satellite which was a very elaborate system, probably as good
as the defense department's, or maybe not quite as good as the
defense department's but it was a huge operation. I talked mainly to
the middle management people, they thought they were going to
make huge amounts of money, which I'm sure is true.
Halliburton was more in the oil business and the mineral
business and they have contractors like Brown & Root to provide
food, logistics, and things of that kind. They were not as much in
evidence in and around Baghdad as Bechtel. One of the Halliburton
people told me thought that they didn't know how much oil was on
the ground and in Iraq, there might be as much as Saudi Arabia
maybe twice as much as the proven reserves because nobody ever
really made much of a scientific effort to find out how much reserves
there were out in the desert towards Saudi Arabia and Jordan. And
there could be two or three, maybe even four times as much reserves
as we had found.
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R: Let me just add that Halliburton, aside from the oil sector, mostly
serves the U.S. troops. They do the mail, the food and so forth.
Bechtel I found, as I said, elephantine, unable to respond quickly, the
whole time I was there, according to their own official press release,
they had fixed one bridge. They were working on hospitals and so on
but again I didn't feel that they were supervising the contractors very
closely. Hearing a lot about the Halliburton price gouging on oil, and I
just want to explain that briefly because it tells you a lot about how
things are going on-and to be fair to Halliburton, they have been
told that there's an agreement between the U.S. government and
Kuwait: in return for Kuwait being the forward staging area, we
agreed to that all petrol would be purchased from one of four sources.
The Kuwaiti government has since said that the petrol is all to be
purchased from one source, which charges $2.42, I think, a gallon.
This is in Kuwait where you can buy a gallon of gas for forty-five
cents or something like that. But the problem is that we have
stipulated they have to buy from this company, that company the
Kuwaitis are charging $2.42 a gallon, there's nothing Halliburton can
do, it's not that they're not making this huge bundle, it's that some
sweetheart deal that was cooked up between the U.S. government
and the Kuwaitis has led to this. That's the kind of stuff we're getting
entangled in, and maybe some part of that may be necessary but
eighty-seven billion doesn't go far as it might when you're paying four
to five times the going rate for stuff.

Q:

About your belief that our main argument for
being there is humanitarian,what about the possible
link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein? What
changed your opinion and, can you tell us any more
about the documents you were talking about that were
delivered in that story?
M: The two lawyers asked me if I'd be interested in a newspaper that
in November 2003 listed the honor roll of 600, one of whom was the
Ambassador to Pakistan, who was said in the list to be in charge of
relations with the Osama bin Laden group. I thought that was
perhaps some evidence, but it's unclear and I don't doubt perhaps
that Saddam would have tried to make league with al Qaeda. But,
although the Vice President continues to say he believes that there is
a clear relationship, I haven't seen any evidence that specifies what
that relationship is. I've somewhat changed my mind because we've
had a lot more time now to pin it down, and I haven't seen anything,
really, that suggests to me that we have pinned it down. It's like the
so-called weapons. After a while you begin to wonder-the President's
probably right, the kind of a guy Saddam was, he probably did have
any kind of weapons he could get-but after so long when there is no
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evidence you know, as a judge, I say "Well, where's the evidence?" and
I just haven't seen it and so I'm beginning to be skeptical about that.

Q:

Do you think there are any successes that we
can count as a result of this military action and its
consequences?
M: Well, we've overthrown Saddam Hussein and we've gotten rid of
one of the worst dictators in the Middle East, maybe in the world
perhaps on the order of Hitler, a dictator who was a tyrant and we
could start naming things that he did that were terrible. We've
overthrown him and we have the prospect of a constitutional
democracy in Iraq. That is a great thing! And, if we are able to not
only overthrow him, but to bring about a constitutional democracy in
Iraq, as a model for the Middle East, that will be a wonderful thing.
That's yet to be determined, but we've made a first step and that's
great.
R: I'd say also that one of the things that has impressed me is the
resiliency, the sort of entrepreneurial spirit that Judge Merritt talked
about with the buses, but the universities also reconstituted
themselves and in many ways are trying, in the face of considerable
pressures from lots of different directions, to model a plural Iraqi
society. Visiting the campuses is on one hand demoralizing because
they have almost no money, yet they are really trying to put together
something that has never existed in Iraq and seldom elsewhere in,
well in the world really, which is a really vibrant, democratic, sort of
debating society where all possibilities are on the table. At the
moment-and it could be one of those magical moments-but at the
moment it's remarkably pluralist, remarkably innovative. There are
some terrific scholars both in technical fields and in the humanities,
and I enjoyed visiting the universities. And again, we took the wraps
off and the Iraqis did it themselves which I think could be a useful
model for the whole business.
M: If this is accomplished, I think the vision of the Bush
Administration is wonderful. It's kind of like the Promised Land over
there. My criticism is that it seems to me we are inhibiting the Iraqi
people from creating the kind of democracy I would like to see at this
point. The vision is great, but the occupation and the implementation
of the vision while perhaps not incompetent has involved so many
errors, beginning with the looting and on down, that the Iraqi people
may have to do it over our dead body to some extent.
Q.:
What can the United States do to protect the
rights of women threatened by a return to pure Islamic
law?
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R: My problem with the whole process was that it was not done
democratically. If there's a popular vote and Iraqis choose to institute
asymmetrical inheritance shares, then that's what democracy is
about, as long as everybody gets to vote. The problem is that this was
done undemocratically, and my understanding is that nothing is
being done by the Americans because we're trying to get everyone to
sign on to the overall multi-leveled democratic development plan,
which as Judge Merritt said will go into the indeterminate future. It's
shortsighted for us to allow them to do that but that's the kind of
trade off that we're making in hiring former members of the
mukhabarat and cozying up to tribal chiefs. I think that these are all
short-sighted moves. The United States could just void it but they're
not going to.
M: You have to keep in mind, legally, we are an occupying power, and
as the occupying power we have an obligation to act under
international law, properly. International law will not recognize
making women second-class citizens. We have to insist on equality for
women in Iraq, as under international law. So for the most part we've
tried to uphold international law in our insistence on things, I don't
know much about what's just recently happened.

Q:
I have a question about the terror attacksand perhaps some of this is more foreign directed, from
outside Iraq-but what sort of progress is being made
there? Do you think the Iraqi citizens in general
support the suicide bombings and other activity?
M: No, I don't think so. Just like public opinion anywhere, if the
electricity's off all day long or there are other problems, public
sentiment is going to be negative. They may think "Well, the
Americans got was good for them about that." But, if you think about
it more deeply, if we lose the support of the Iraqi people, we've had it.
We can't erect a democratic government without the support of the
great majority of the Iraqi people. I don't think we've lost that yet but
we need to do better.
R: I would say also that you have to realize that the overwhelming
number of people who are killed-I mean for every American that's
killed by one of these things, twenty or thirty Iraqis are being killed.
What the Iraqis are angry about is that we're letting this happen. It's
Iraqis who are being killed, so, I don't think there's support for that.
Of course, the area I was in was more sympathetic. The other thing
that was really striking to me was, for example that head of military
operations said this summer that he had only recently been advised
by his Iraqi advisors, that breaking into people's houses, putting bags
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over their husbands heads, cuffing them, and dragging them out was
perceived as humiliating, and that perhaps we should think about not
doing it that way. Now, it doesn't take a lot of cultural sensitivity to
imagine that that would be perceived as humiliating, and humiliating
people is not what you want to do if you want to win them over. It's
that sort of thing that can harm us. So I believe there has been
recently a fall off, about a twenty percent drop in support. But, if you
stopped all of that tomorrow, that would not make the occupation a
success. That's the thing I'd like to leave you with: Let's suppose we
stopped, there were no more suicide bombings, there were no more
improvised explosive devices, no more sniping, let's suppose all that
happened. All the reporters from the CNN would go home, but it
would not make the occupation a success, and it would not guarantee
the sort of state that everyone involved thinks is necessary for future
democracy and order.
M: When I got there, it was right in the flush times of optimism, May
and June, and the support for the Americans was very high and the
terrorist types hadn't gotten into the country yet. I think there's a
little less support now. My friends over there tell me that the Iraqi
people understand that they've got to cooperate with the Americans
for their own good, and then the Shi'a leadership like Sistani has
been very moderate and doesn't want to create an Islamic state, just a
theocracy in the narrow sense of the word.

Q:

In so many of my conversations about
reconstructing Iraq, so many people think that the
work is in teaching Iraqis how to get democracy, about
communicating philosophy and values. But, so much
of what you have said shows that the core values and
ideals are already there, especially your story about the
bus workers. But, what you seem to be saying is that
the systems need to be put into place, we need
electricity, we need a census, rather than ideas. Do you
think that the current people in power are doing too
much visioning? What is preventing the systems being
put in place-is it just that the Americans aren't
getting it?
R: There are a couple of different issues. If, by systems, you mean the
physical, hardware stuff, my own take is that it's like hiring a
contractor for your house who turns out not to be the right one for the
job. It's not getting done, and that's just a measurable outcome. It
seems to me that when that happens when somebody's working on
your house, you hire another contractor or you go to a bunch of
different contractors. But I don't want to dismiss the idea, and
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remember I quoted the David Brooks piece, I do think that there are
problems of what you might call political psychology.
Just a quick anecdote: I worked with this really smart, curious,
sweet guy, a really nice guy I respected a lot. Anyway, I was going
down the road with this guy, and I said "So what do you think of
Muqtada?" (a street politician on the Shi'ite side, with no credibility
as a scholar, but who's organizing the constituency that used to be
Communist; the Shi'i urban proletariat whom everybody has stepped
on for decades). He said, "Oh he's really terrible, he's causing
disorder, you know, he's really causing problems, and somebody
should kill him." And I said, "Well that's not a good idea, why don't
you organize demonstrations?" And he replied, "Oh no, everybody
would be afraid to organize demonstrations, they'd kill us." And I
said, 'Well, but you've got to have demonstrations cause he's having
demonstrations." And he said, "No, somebody should kill him."
Now, as long as that's a part of the political discourse, it seems to
me that there are problems. There is some work being done, I think
it's rather high priced for what's actually happening, but also at the
lower level. The group that I was involved with-and I was not
involved in this directly so I can blow the horn of the guy I was
working with-developed a program of having all of the Iraqi NGOs
in Najaf meet regularly. He got the military to give them a space so
they would all have offices. He got grants for projects so they were
doing things like recording the names of people who had been killed,
recording all of the places that had been damaged in the war (because
you're entitled to compensation if your house had been bombed). He
organized groups that were putting together vocational training
programs and things like that. There's real empirical data that
supports the idea that these intermediary organizations are
important for creating political culture but also for limiting the state.
I do think there are practical things that are being done, practical
things that need to be done as well as fixing the electricity; we also
have to help Iraqis discover their ability to negotiate with each other.
M: On the governmental side of that, I think the basic problem is we
just made a mistake in not going ahead and getting electoral
machinery and a census. Instead we went with this governing counsel
as the way we decided to try to present things to the Iraqi people.
This decision got made instead of other possible alternatives and that
has been a mistake. And we're living with that mistake right now.
Q:
What political and legal implications does the
current situation in Iraq have for the region as a
whole? Do you see any trends developing or any
possible transitions to democracy or regression based
on what's going in Iraq?
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M: The only thing I can say in answer to that question is not going to
be very helpful: if you'll look at military historians from Theucidides
and the Peloponnesian wars, down through von Clausiwitz to modern
day military historians, the one thing they say is, once you initiate a
military action like this, with some vision of what you want to
happen, you have not the vaguest idea of what in fact is going to
happen. That is, you are asking about the consequences of this in ten
years, or even two or three decades. My understanding of the theory
of military historians is that you never know. You may know that you
can overthrow Saddam Hussein, and you may hope, with some
understanding that you can create a constitutional democracy and
self rule, but what effect that will have in the region. I think it is just
anybody's guess.
R: I'd say right now in the short term, there's no doubt that antipathy
toward the United States is much greater than I've ever seen it, and
I've been going since 1967. If, for instance, Iraq is divided-that is
what everybody is anticipating, that the United States is going to
break Iraq up because the whole idea is that colonialism divides the
Arab world in order to weaken it-so if Iraq is divided, or if it falls
apart, then that will be seen as part of a great plot. If, on the other
hand, we manage to construct something like this, and can point to it,
that would have a profound effect on the Middle East.
People underestimate the extent to which Israel-Palestine
remains the justification for the undemocratic states. And you can
say that that's fictional, but fiction here is reality. Politics is based on
perception and if that conflict were solved in an equitable way, if Iraq
were to provide not just a model but another option, then, it seems to
me, we could anticipate lots of good things. But, those are really big
ifs.
Q.:
Will we get there with PaulBremer, and if not,
how long do you think he will be in place?
M: He's leaving July 1, 2004.
Q:
I grew up in Lebanon under the Frenchinstituted system. There is a functioning constitution
that's been respected for the last fifty years except for
some time during the civil war. We elect a
representative every four years, still have colonialism,
sectarianism,and tribalism in our system. The way we
do it is we nominate one panel and everybody gets to
vote so that it's not part of the culture, but the rule of
law. What will the Americans leave behind to protect
the rule of law from someone who wants to come in
and take over?
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M: I don't want to be pumping up the judiciary because I've been
there long enough to see all the flaws in the U.S. judiciary. But you
cannot have the rule of law-contracts enforced fairly, civil liberties
protected, a whole panoply of things that we refer to under the rubric
of the rule of law-without several things. Many people like Judge
Hand have said in some ways the spirit of liberty lives in the heart of
a population. It is not just in a written document. There's a lot of
truth to that. I mean, it's history, it's tradition, it's institutions. But I
do think that it's impossible without an independent judiciary which
is relatively well-educated and relatively fair, and is trying to do the
right thing, and is not a part of telephone justice and not a part of
cronyism and has certain standards that it has to meet in terms of
conflict of interest and so forth. We have enough flaws in our own
system, but that has got to be created and institutionalized in Iraq or
any other place before the rule of law can really prevail and become
durable. That's my thought about it.
R: This may sound a little flippant, but I mean it perfectly seriously.
A great Jewish philosopher at Princeton, Walter Kaufman, said, "Say
what you want about Hitler, but he gave anti-Semitism a bad name."
What I found in Iraq was a real resolution that Saddam was not
going to happen again. People were saying, and this was when he was
still at large, "That's it! I've had it! If he comes back now, we are all
armed. Nobody's going to put up with this again." People would say of
someone, "You know, he's a 'Saddami"' It referred not to the fact that
he was a supporter of Saddam, but that he was thinking like Saddam.
It seems to me also that just as the Lebanese are willing to make all
sorts of compromises not to have the kind of disorder that they had in
the 1980s, the Iraqis are really determined not to have another
nationalist-statist dictator. This could be exactly what Judge Merritt
is talking about, that the resolution not to go back is what propels you
forward. I think that that's really a cause for hope in Iraq and I hope
that it's an effective motivator as well.

